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L’objectif de cette étude est de vérifier la relation entre les structures de propriété des sociétés 
canadiennes et leurs activités d’innovation. Nous prévoyons qu’une forte concentration de 
contrôle ainsi que la présence de structures à contrôle minoritaire (CMS) aient un impact négatif 
sur les activités de R&D des sociétés manufacturières canadiennes. Nos résultats indiquent que 
la concentration de contrôle dans les mains d’actionnaires dominants de sociétés CMS affecte 
négativement les résultats des investissements en R&D. Plus spécifiquement, nous constatons que 
l’écart entre les droits de contrôle et les droits de propriété des actionnaires dominants est 
positivement associé à l’intensité des investissements en R&D mais négativement associé aux 
résultats de ces activités. Ces résultats peuvent suggérer que les actionnaires dominants des 
sociétés CMS investissent en R&D pour réaliser des gains privés plutôt que d’être performants 
en matière d’innovation.  
 
Mots clés: Structures de propriété, structures à contrôle minoritaire (CMS), enracinement, 




This study examines the link between ownership structures and R&D activities in Canada. Our main 
hypothesis is that highly concentrated ownership structures or the presence of controlling minority 
shareholders negatively affects R&D intensity of Canadian manufacturing firms. We observe a 
negative relationship between the concentration of voting rights in firms endowed with a 
controlling minority structure (CMS) and the outcome of R&D activities.  Furthermore, we show 
that the level of separation between the voting and cash flow rights held by controlling 
shareholders has a positive effect on R&D intensity but a negative effect on R&D outcome. These 
results may suggest that CMS shareholders’ incentives regarding investments in R&D are not 
oriented towards innovative improvement but rather towards obtaining private gains.  
 














































As innovation contributes to the evolution of living standards, investments in research and 
development (R&D) play a major role in the economic growth of developed countries (Cox, 
2001; Romer, 1986). The economic importance of innovation was notably established by 
Schumpeter (1939) who argued that creative destruction is indispensable in assuring the growth 
of capitalist societies.  Since then, empirical studies have shown that R&D investments have a 
positive impact on economic growth, on firm value (Lev and Sougiannis, 1996; Chan et al., 2001; 
Johnson and Pazderka, 1993; Cho, 1998), and on firm performance (Hill and Snell, 1988; Lau, 
1998).   
Morck, Strangeland and Yeung (2000), on the other hand, show that heir controlled firms 
invest less on R&D than other firms that are widely held or controlled by the founding owners. In 
their view, because innovation is logically associated with the renewal of products and services, 
the concept of creative destruction could threaten the actual wealth of families who control large 
firms around the world. Creative destruction in itself may cause a reluctance to invest in R&D for 
large shareholders who want to maintain their vested interest in their firm’s capital. Thus, 
inefficiencies in certain forms of firm ownership structures could have a negative impact on R&D 
investments.   
In this study, we investigate whether corporate ownership structures affect the R&D 
activity of Canadian firms. More specifically, we investigate whether the widely documented 
ownership concentration of Canadian firms (Bozec and Laurin, 2004) affects R&D investments 
and the outcome of R&D. Our results show that the concentration of controlling shareholders’ 
voting rights negatively affects R&D intensity of Canadian manufacturing firms. Furthermore, 
our results indicate that the level of separation between the voting and cash flow rights held by 
controlling shareholders has a positive effect on R&D intensity but a negative effect on R&D 
outcome.  
The article is structured as follows. In Section I, we provide a theoretical framework and 
discuss the empirical findings of previous research linking ownership concentration and R&D. 
The research hypotheses are discussed in Section II. In Section III, we explain the data collection 
process, our choice of variables, and our research model.  The empirical results are discussed in 
Section IV.  In the final section of the article, we provide a conclusion and we suggest avenues 










































Section 1:  Theoretical framework and literature review  
Based on agency theory, Jensen and Meckling (1976) argue that the separation of ownership and 
control affects firm performance through sub-optimal investment decisions. Agency theory 
predicts that a manager’s incentive in making optimal investment decisions increases as a 
function of his stake in the firm’s equity. Thus, concentrated ownership could alleviate manager-
shareholders’ conflict of interest in inducing investment decisions that creates value for the 
shareholders.  Ownership concentration could therefore be considered as a mean to reduce Type I 
agency costs associated with sub-optimal investment decisions (Villalonga and Amit, 2006). This 
theory, conceptualized to better understand agency issues in modern widely held firms, has 
gathered a relatively strong empirical support from earlier studies (Hill and Snell, 1988).   
While it could reduce Type I agency costs, ownership concentration can also raise other 
agency problems. Villalonga and Amit (2006) argue that concentrated ownership is a source of 
conflict between large shareholders, who control the firm’s assets, and minority shareholders, 
who provide financing but run the risk of expropriation.  In this context, Type II agency costs 
exist mostly because large shareholders are entrenched and can impose their choices even when 
these choices run against firm value maximization. Previous research has shown that at certain 
levels of concentration, the positive impact of corporate ownership concentration on firm value 
reverses and becomes negative (Morck et al., 1988; McConnell and Servaes, 1990; Hermalin and 
Weibach, 1991; Gompers et al, 2004). 
Type II agency costs have many potential sources. For instance, wealthy families who 
own a large proportion of voting rights could make suboptimal investment decisions, such as 
over-expanding through mergers and acquisition instead of pursuing an R&D strategy that leads 
to creative destruction (Morck et al. 2003). These kinds of decision can increase the socio-
political influence of the family, but can alter the value of minority holdings (Johnson et al., 
2000). Also, in firms with concentrated ownership, strategic roles, such as leading research and 
development, are often assigned to member of the controlling family rather than to the most 
capable manager (Caselli and Gennaioli, 2003).  
But if ownership concentration is a necessary condition for Type II agency costs, it is not 
a sufficient condition. A priori, large shareholders do not have a clear incentive to reduce firm 









































0many countries showing high levels of corporate voting rights concentration, a considerable 
number of firms are incorporated as controlling minority structures (CMS). A CMS allows a 
controlling shareholder to retain high levels of voting right while owning a smaller proportion of 
the firm’s cash flow rights. Under these circumstances, the controlling shareholders of CMS 
firms could benefit from private gains without incurring a fair share of the costs associated with 
their decisions. Therefore, Type II agency costs are likely to be more important for firms 
endowed with a CMS.   
Previous research investigating the link between ownership structure and firm value or 
performance has yielded mixed results.  Using a sample of 1,301 firms in Eastern Asia, Claessens 
et al. (2002) find a positive relationship between the concentration of cash flow rights of main 
shareholders and firm value.  Furthermore, the authors find that the difference between voting 
rights and cash flow rights held by the largest shareholder has a negative impact on firm value. 
Faccio and Lang (1999) perform a similar study on 3,740 European firms. They also find a 
positive relationship between the concentration of cash flow rights of the main shareholder and 
firm value but only when there is no other important shareholder.  However, they do not find any 
significant relationship between the separation of voting and cash flow rights and firm value. 
Studying a sample of 309 Swedish firms, Cronqvist and Nilsson (2003) observe a negative 
relationship between the voting rights of main shareholders and firm value.  
In Canada, Bozec and Laurin (2004) conduct a study on a sample of 487 Canadian firms. 
They find that the concentration of voting rights held by the main shareholder is positively 
related to firm performance. However, they find a negative relationship between the separation of 
voting and cash flow rights of the main shareholder and firm performance but only when the cash 
flow rights of that shareholder is less then 25%. Bozec and Laurin(2007) show that this 
relationship is even stronger in the presence of free cash flows.  
Other studies investigate the impact of ownership concentration controlling for the type of 
dominant shareholder. The general findings suggest that when the company founder is still 
involved in the administration or the management of the firm, concentration has a positive impact 
on value creation. Otherwise, in the case of heir controlled firms, value tends to be destroyed 
(Villalonga and Amit, 2006; Morck et al., 2002). Moreover, CMS firms controlled by non-










































0Corporate ownership structures and R&D activity  
Although investing in research and development can contribute to value maximisation 
(Lev and Sougiannis, 1996; Chan et al., 2001; Johnson and Pazderka, 1993; Cho, 1988) and 
financial performance (Hill and Snell, 1988; Lau, 1998), such investments may be risky, 
requiring on average 3 to 6 years of ongoing efforts and expenses before a firm could actually 
benefit from research outcomes. Even then, more than 30-90% of all new products fail (Needles, 
1994, cited by Persons, 1999). Holmstrom (1989) explains that agency costs associated with 
innovative activity are likely to be high because such projects are risky, labor-intensive, 
idiosyncratic, and their profitability, if any, can only been assessed in the long run.   
Studies analyzing the relationship between ownership concentration and R&D 
investments show that when corporate ownership is widely-held, ownership concentration has a 
positive effect on R&D investments (Hill and Snell, 1988; Cho, 1998; Baysinger et al., 1991 
Gompers et al., 2004), and R&D outcomes (Francis and Smith, 1995).  However at higher levels 
of concentration, agency problems associated with entrenchment seem to reverse the effect of 
ownership concentration on R&D, which becomes significantly negative (Cho, 1998; Gompers et 
al., 2004). Because recent research globally shows that widely-held firms tend to be more the 
exception than they are the norm (La Porta et al., 1999), it is worthwhile to investigate the links 
between R&D, ownership concentration and Type II agency costs.  
Gugler, Mueller and Yurtuglu (2004) analyze the relationship between corporate 
governance, ownership structures, and investment performance including R&D activity on a 
sample of 19,000 firms from 61 different countries.  They show that in countries with weaker 
legal governance systems, widely-held firms have a better investment performance than closely-
held ones. They argue that in countries where legal shareholder protection systems are not 
strongly enforced and ownership concentration is prevalent, entrenchment issues are more severe 
and lead to poorer investment performance.   
Canada offers an interesting setting to study the link between ownership concentration 
and R&D outcomes. In Canada, corporate ownership is highly concentrated yet the legal 
shareholder protection system is strongly enforced (La Porta et al, 1998). Thus, empirical results 
drawn from previously cited non-Canadian studies can hardly be generalized to the Canadian 
context. Morck et al. (2002) conducted the main empirical study that investigates the relationship 









































0type of controlling shareholders and R&D investments, they find that heir controlled firms invest 
significantly less on R&D than widely-held Canadian firms.   
Morck et al. (2002) mention the importance of CMS in the Canadian economy but they do 
not control for this variable.  Cronqvist and Nilsson (2003) explain that because controlling 
shareholders of CMS firms have fewer stakes in the firm’s capital, they may choose to invest in 
projects that maximize their private gains even if such projects are non-value-maximizing for the 
firm.  Bebchuk et al. (2000) illustrate in their theoretical model that, when faced with two 
investment choices – one that is value maximizing and one that is not but allows the controlling 
shareholders to benefit from private gains – shareholders will choose the one that generates 
private gains so long as their benefits from private gains exceed their benefits from the value-
maximizing investment. Moreover, Morck and Young (2003) explain that in pyramid formed 
CMS firm groups, controlling shareholders may expropriate other minority shareholders through 
“tunnelling,” a process by which they transfer profits from the firms at the bottom of the pyramid 
to the ones at the top.  Similarly, losses from firms at the top of the pyramid are shifted to the 
firms at the bottom.   
Although no study has directly analysed the impact of the separation of voting and cash 
flow rights on R&D activity, many studies have shown that such a separation has a negative 
impact on firm value (Claessens et al., 2002, Villalonga and Amit, 2006), and on financial 
performance especially when the stakes on the controlling shareholders’ cash flow rights are low 
(Bozec and Laurin, 2004).  
 
Section 2:  Research hypothesis  
In this study, we analyse the relationship between the concentration of corporate control and 
R&D activity. In addition, we analyze the impact of the separation of voting and cash flow rights 
of the main shareholders on Canadian firms’ R&D activities. Empirical findings on the 
relationship between corporate ownership concentration and R&D activity are mixed and differ 
according to economic contexts. In economies mostly characterised by widely-held firms, 
ownership concentration could resolve the alignment problem and contribute to R&D intensity. 
However, in some countries where corporate ownership structures are highly concentrated, 
entrenchment issues could negatively affect investments in R&D (Czarnitzki and Kraft, 2005) or 









































0  In Canada, high levels of ownership concentration pave the way to entrenchment. Because 
the benefits of R&D remain highly uncertain, large shareholders may be reluctant to invest in 
innovative activities which may lead to creative destruction of the firm’s actual capital. In 
addition, entrenched shareholders are shielded against hostile takeover. As a result, they may 
become somewhat inert and avoid investments such as R&D projects, which require a great 
amount of effort. Hence, we predict a negative relationship between corporate control 
concentration and R&D activity. We also argue that less investment will most likely lead to fewer 
outcomes from R&D activities. H1a and H1b reflect these predictions: 
H1a:   In Canada, the concentration of a corporation’s voting rights in the hands of a 
dominant shareholder has a negative impact on the intensity of R&D investments. 
 
H1b:   In Canada, the concentration of a corporation’s voting rights in the hands of a 
dominant shareholder has a negative impact on the outcome from R&D activities.  
  
Our second research hypothesis pertains to the impact of ownership structures on R&D 
outcome. Based on Bebchuk and al’s (2000) theoretical model, we argue that when their cash 
flow rights are very small, the controlling shareholders externalize most of the costs associated 
with suboptimal investment decisions. Accordingly, the greater the gap between their voting and 
cash flow rights, the greater the incentive for controlling shareholders to expropriate other 
shareholders using sub-optimal investment decisions. Therefore, whether controlling 
shareholders expropriate other public shareholders by suboptimal investment choices, or whether 
the expropriation results from tunnelling procedures, the proportion of the separation between 
voting and cash flow rights of the controlling shareholders should have a negative impact on 
R&D activity.   
H2:  In Canada, the outcome of R&D activities is negatively affected by difference between 
voting and cash flow rights held by a controlling shareholder.  
 
Section 3:  Methodology 
3.1 Data collection 
Our initial sample consists of 259 Canadian manufacturing firms (sic codes ranging from 









































0available for any financial period between 1998 and 2003. We excluded one firm with the head 
office located outside Canada as well as four firms for which financial or corporate ownership 
data was not available. To make sure that the absence of R&D activity of selected firms was not 
driven by the specific characteristics of their industries, we excluded all firms for which the 
average industry level of R&D spending was equal to zero. Our final sample consists of 205 
firms and 1,192 firm-year observations. 
Financial data covering fiscal periods from 1998 to 2003 inclusively, and 2004 if 
available, were retrieved from the Stock guide database.  Information on corporate ownership 
structure was collected using management proxies available on the SEDAR database; patents 
information was drawn from the Canadian Intellectual Property Office (CIPO) website. Other 
firm-specific data, such as the presence of the firms’ original founders and the firm age, was 
drawn from the firms’ annual reports or from their website. 
 
3.2 Model and variables definition 
To test our research hypotheses, we use the following pooled cross-sectional time series 
model: 
 
R&D activity j =       α0 + α1 OWNERSHIP STRUCTUREj + α2 SIZE j + α3 AGE j + α4 II j +  
                     α5 INDj +  α6FOUNDER j + α7DEBTj  +ε j                                                       (1)
 
We analyse R&D activity from two different perspectives: R&D intensity, and R&D 
outcome. Accordingly, our first dependent variable (R&D) represents the level of R&D intensity 
as defined by the ratio of a firm’s R&D expense divided by total assets. This measure of R&D 
intensity is also used by Francis and Smith (1995), Cho (1988) and Abdullah et al. (2002).  Our 
second proxy of R&D activity relates to the outcome of R&D investments. We measure R&D 
outcome by the number of patents granted to a firm in a given year (PGY).
 1
We use two approaches to proxy for OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE. Our first research 
hypothesis predicts a negative relationship between the concentration of corporate control and 
R&D activity. To test H1a and H1b, OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE is proxied by the corporate 
control concentration (CONT), a variable measured by the percentage of voting rights held by the 
ultimate controlling shareholder 









































0R&D activity is negatively affected by the difference between voting and cash flow rights of 
CMS controlling shareholders. To test H2, OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE is proxied by a measure 
of the separation between voting and cash flow rights of the controlling shareholders (SEPDIFF). 
SEPDIFF is simply calculated by the difference between the percentage of voting rights and cash 
flow rights.
3 Hence, the variable SEPDIFF measures the excess voting rights of controlling 
shareholders which, in a conventional non-CMS firm, will be equal to 0. 
To control for firm specific characteristics, we include in our analyses a series of control 
variables that previous studies have linked to R&D.  In line with Francis and Smith’s (1995), we 
control for the size (SIZE) and the age (AGE) of firms, the industry to which they belong (IND), 
as well as the presence of the firms’ founders in a top management or a board position 
(FOUNDER). Many other studies that have examined R&D activity show that the presence of 
institutional investors (Graves, 1988) as well as a firm’s leverage (Czarnitzki and Kraft, 2005) 
may have a significant impact on R&D activity. In line with these findings, we also include in 
our analyses the percentage of institutional shareholdings (%II) and the ratio of long term debt to 
total assets (DEBT).  Appendix 3 presents our list of dependent and independent variables and 
their description. 
In order to compare our findings with other studies, we initially use OLS regression 
technique.
4  However, the OLS technique may not be a suitable approach for at least two reasons. 
First, in a cross-sectional time series sample such as ours, serial correlation of the error terms for 
observations from the same company can lead to misspecification. Second, since the distribution 
of the R&D intensity variable is truncated at 0, we cannot meet OLS’s requirement that residuals 
need to be normally distributed in order to obtain unbiased estimators. To avoid these 
econometrics problems, we run panel data analysis using maximum likelihood estimator (MLE) 
models. We use the Tobit estimator to analyse R&D intensity. The Tobit model is also used in 
more recent studies analysing R&D intensity (Sanguinnetti, 2005; Gompers et al., 2004; Morck et 
al., 2002).   
OLS is not suitable to analyse count data such as the number of granted patents (PGY). 
For models ran on PGY, we used the Poisson model,
5 which accounts for the discrete distribution 
inherent to this variable. Moreover, this model is suitable when 0 is frequent in the value 
distribution of the dependant variable.  Therefore, we analyse R&D outcome using a version of 










































Section 4:  Results 
4.1 Descriptive statistics   
Table 1 provides descriptive statistics for the variables included in this study. The first 
section provides statistics for the R&D activity variables.  In our sample, R&D spending averages 
7% of total assets, a result similar to those obtained in other North American studies (see for 
instance Cho, 1998).  The average number of yearly granted patents (PGY) is slightly less than 1.  
The second section of Table 1 reports descriptive statistics for the ownership structure variables.  
These statistics reveal that controlling shareholders hold, on average, 28 % of firms’ voting 
rights. The CMS dummy variable statistics reveal that firm-year observations for which the 
controlling shareholder holds more voting rights than flow rights represent 17.6% of the sample.  
The average difference between voting and cash flow rights for all firm-year observation amounts 
to 6 %. Finally, in the last section of Table 1, we report statistics on the control variables, such as 
the presence of firms’ founders, the percentage of institutional ownership and other firm 
characteristics. Most of these statistics are similar to those reported in other Canadian studies 
(Bozec and Laurin, 2007). 
[Insert Table 1] 
4.2 Univariate analysis  
In Table 2, we compare R&D activities based on different types of ownership structures.  
Firms where a controlling shareholder holds 20% or more voting rights (identified as closely 
held) are first compared with the other firms included in the sample. In line with our predictions, 
we observe that closely held firms spend significantly less in R&D then do the other firms. 
However, no significant differences are observed between closely held and the other firms with 
respect to R&D outcomes. Then, we compare CMS firms with conventional (non-CMS) firms. 
The univariate results suggest that CMS firms have higher R&D outcomes than conventional 
non-CMS firms, a result which contradicts H2. 
 [Insert Table 2] 
Table 3 presents a partial Pearson’s correlation matrix including ownership structure and 
R&D activity variables. The correlations observed between R&D intensity and ownership 
concentration indicators are significantly negative. These results support H1.  The matrix reveals 









































0report a significantly positive correlation between CMS firms and granted patent. Although these 
results tend to support H1 and to contradict H2, the univariate analyses remain incomplete until 
we perform more compelling analyses that take into consideration the other factors that may 
influence R&D activity.   
[Insert Table 3] 
4.3 Multivariate analysis 
   The results of MLE regression analyses are reported in Table 4.
6  In the first two columns, 
we test the impact of voting rights concentration on R&D intensity (H1a) and on R&D outcome 
(H1b). The impact of the separation between voting and cash flow rights on R&D outcome (H2) 
is presented in the last column of table 4.  
[Insert Table 4] 
As H1a predicts, the results in the second column of Table 4 indicate a significantly 
negative relationship between the percentage of voting rights held by controlling shareholders 
(CONT) and R&D intensity (α1 = -0.067; P<5%).  However, no significant relationship is found 
between CONT and R&D outcome (PGY), as shown in column 3 of Table 4.  
The relationship between the separation of the voting and cash flow rights of controlling 
shareholders (SEPDIFF) and R&D outcome (PGY) is tested in column 4. Because SEPDIFF 
increases with the proportion of voting rights held by the controlling shareholder, it can serve as a 
proxy for ownership concentration. To avoid capturing control concentration effects by the use of 
SEPDIFF, we also include CONT in the regression. Consistent with H2, we obtain a statistically 
negative coefficient for SEPDIFF (α2 = -4.419; P<1%). However, we also find a significantly 
positive coefficient for CONT (α1 = 2.509; P<1%). These findings suggest that while the voting 
rights of controlling shareholders favour R&D outcomes, the proportion of separation between 
voting and cash flow rights impedes on these outcomes.   
In general, our findings are consistent with our research hypotheses H1a and H2. Results 
in table 4 suggest that the voting rights of controlling shareholders limit R&D investments 
whereas R&D outcome is decreasing as the gap between voting rights and cash flow rights 
increases. Results reported in Table 4 also show that some of our firm-specific variables have a 
significant impact on R&D activity. We observe a generally negative relationship between firm 
size and R&D intensity. These results contradict earlier theoretical and empirical studies 









































0findings (Holmstrom 1989, Scherer 1984, Barker and Mueller, 2002). Consistent with the results 
of previous studies, we also find a significantly positive relationship between R&D intensity 
levels, R&D outcomes, and the industry’s R&D activity (Baysinger and al., 1991). In addition, 
our results show a significantly positive relationship between firm leverage and R&D activity.  
These latter findings suggest that creditors may encourage value-creative activity such as R&D, 
regardless of the risky nature of such investments.  Finally, we find that when analysing R&D 
outcome, firm age is a significant variable that positively influences patent grants.  
4.4 Sensitivity analysis 
While our basic model assumes a monotonic relationship between the concentration of 
voting rights of controlling shareholders and R&D activity, previous empirical results have 
shown that the monotonicity of this relationship could be challenged (Gompers et al., 2004; 
Abdullah et al. 2002; Cho, 1998). Based on these results, we test an alternative model which 
allows for a non-monotonic relationship between CONT and R&D activity. To do so, we include 
CONT50+ in the regression model.CONT50+ measures the percentage of voting rights held by 
controlling shareholders when the concentration of these voting rights are 50% and above. The 
results of the sensitivity analyses that include CONT50+ are presented in table 5. 
[Insert Table 5] 
The results displayed in the first regression of table 5 indicate a significantly negative 
relationship between CONT and R&D but a significantly positive relationship between 
CONT50+ and R&D. These results suggest that if the concentration of voting rights impedes on 
R&D investment, this seems to be particularly true when the controlling shareholder holds less 
than 50% of the voting rights.  In fact, the relationship between concentration and R&D becomes 
positive when the level of concentration of the voting rights is above 50%. The relationship 
between the concentration of voting rights and PGY (regression 2, table 5) is also reversed for 
CONT50+.  The results indicate that while voting rights concentration seems to favour R&D 
outcome, the positive effect of concentration on PGY seems to be eradicated when the controlling 
shareholder holds more than 50% of the voting rights.   
To explain these contradictory results, one could argue that the alignment effect at higher 
levels of concentration alleviates the negative relationship between CONT and R&D intensity. 
But the previous literature (Morck et al., 1988) has also shown that at higher levels of 









































0alignment, thereby reinforcing the assumption of a negative relationship between CONT and 
R&D outcome.  Given that the entrenchment problem is likely to be more severe in the case of 
CMS firms, it is quite possible that the relationship between voting rights concentration and R&D 
activity varies depending on the nature of the ownership structure. To account for this possibility, 
we further examine the relationship between the concentration of voting rights and R&D activity 
(R&D and PGY) for two sub-samples: CMS and conventional non-CMS firms. The results of 
these analyses are reported in regressions 3, 4, 5 and 6 of table 5.   
The results obtained from these analyses show that for conventional firms, the controlling 
shareholders’ voting rights concentration has a significantly negative impact on R&D intensity 
but a significantly positive impact on R&D outcome. These results show that in conventional 
non-CMS firms, investment in R&D activities is decreasing as a function of voting rights 
concentration. But for these firms, R&D investment tends to be more fruitful as voting rights 
concentration increases. 
For the sub-sample of CMS firms, we find a positive (but not statistically significant) 
relationship between the concentration of voting rights and R&D intensity and a significantly 
negative relationship between concentration and R&D outcome. In the case of CMS firms, as the 
concentration of voting rights increases, R&D investment tends to be less fruitful.  This result 
indicates that the money invested in R&D by the decision makers in highly concentrated CMS 
firms tends to generate less tangible results. This result could be worrisome for minority 
shareholders. In fact, this result supports the idea that for CMS firms, R&D investment could be 
used for purposes other than to generate patents, and these purposes could include expropriation 
through woeful R&D investments (Morck et al., 2002).  
The next series of sensitivity analyses measures the impact of excess voting rights on 
R&D activity in CMS firms. Previous studies on ownership structures and firm performance have 
shown that the negative impact of excess voting rights on firm performance could be exacerbated 
when the cash flow rights of controlling shareholders are low (Bozec and Laurin, 2007). To 
account for this possibility, we include CFR10SEPDIFF in the regression. This interactive term 
measures excess voting rights of the controlling shareholder when her cash flow rights are lower 
than 10%.  Previous studies also suggest that controlling shareholders of pyramid shaped CMS 
structures may use tunnelling procedures to expropriate minority shareholders by transferring 









































0whether the potential use of such tunnelling procedures might generate more R&D investment in 
pyramid shaped CMS structures, we include a third interactive term, PYRSEPDIFF, which 
measures the excess voting rights of controlling shareholders involved in pyramid structures.  
The results of these analyses are presented on the right hand side of Table 5 (regressions 7 to 10).  
Results obtained from regressions 7 and 8 suggest that for the sub-sample of CMS firms, 
excess voting rights held by controlling-minority shareholders positively affects R&D 
investments but negatively affects PGY. Therefore, it is possible that controlling-minority 
shareholders may be seeking private gains by investing large sums in suboptimal R&D activity 
instead of focussing their attention on R&D that creates value. The significantly negative 
coefficient for CFR10SEPDIFF in regression 7 suggests that the positive effect of SEPDIFF on 
R&D intensity may be less important when controlling shareholders own a small proportion of 
cash flow rights.  In regression 8, the coefficient for CFR10SEPDIFF is insignificant, implying 
that the relationship between SEPDIFF and R&D outcome is unaffected by the proportion of cash 
flow rights owned by the controlling shareholders.  
Results obtained in regressions 9 suggest that the relationship between PYRSEPDIFF and 
R&D intensity is significantly positive. To some extent, the fact that R&D investments seem to 
be greater in pyramids supports the notion of tunnelling. This notion is further supported by the 
results of regression 10, which reveals that the relationship between PYRSEPDIFF and PGY is 
insignificant. By putting these two results together, it could be argued that although R&D 
investment is greater in pyramid, the outcome, as measured by the number of patents granted, is 
not affected by the nature of the structure.  This could suggest that when seeking private gains, 
controlling shareholders of pyramids may choose to invest in R&D activity in firms located at the 
lower levels and then find means to transfer this money towards the pyramid’s apex (Morck et al. 
2003).   
In terms of control variables, results in table 5 show that the relationship between firm 
specific characteristics and the dependant variables differs according to the corporate ownership 
type. For example, the positive relationship between firm age and R&D activities is only 
significant for CMS firms. Moreover, the relationship between leverage and R&D activity is 
significantly positive for conventional non-CMS firms but significantly negative for CMS firms. 
To explain this result, we hypothesize that given the risk of tunnelling and expropriation in CMS 









































0projects such as R&D. Results in Table 5 also show that for CMS firms, the presence of the 
founders has a significantly positive effect on R&D investments and R&D outcome. To that 
effect, Morck et al. (2002) argue that when the founders are involved in the administration of 
CMS firms, they will tend favour value-creative investments such as R&D.  
We also conduct additional sensitivity tests to analyze the robustness of the main results. 
All our multivariate tests have been rerun while performing the following independent 
manipulations: 1) using dummy variables for the level of voting rights concentration (instead of 
continuous variables), 2) including alternative measures of the separation between voting and 
cash-flow rights (dummy variable and the ratio of cash-flow rights to voting rights) in the 
regressions, 3) running a quadratic regression to test the non-monotonic relationship between 
voting rights concentration and R&D activity, 4) including alternative measures of R&D intensity 
such as industry adjusted R&D investments and, 5) excluding observations for which the 
residuals fall beyond three standard deviations from the mean. Although not reported here, the 
results remained qualitatively unchanged.  
 
5. Conclusion 
The purpose of this study is to understand the impact of Canadian corporate ownership structures 
on R&D activity. We provide empirical evidence on the effects of ownership concentration, CMS 
structures, and excess voting rights held by controlling-minority shareholders on R&D intensity 
and R&D outcome. Our results indicate that, in the case of conventional non-CMS firms, 
ownership concentration is negatively associated with R&D intensity but positively associated 
with R&D outcome. For CMS firms, ownership concentration does not seem to affect R&D 
intensity but hampers on R&D outcome, especially when the cash flow rights of the dominant 
shareholders are at low levels.  We also find that the percentage of excess voting rights is 
positively associated with R&D intensity but negatively associated with R&D outcome. This 
latter finding may cast some doubt on the real objectives that controlling-minority shareholders 
pursue when they decide to increase R&D spending. 
Our research contributes to the literature on two different fronts. First, we provide 
empirical support to the more theoretical research that has hypothesized a negative link between 
concentrated ownership, separation and value creative R&D. Earlier research by Morck et al. 









































0findings published by Francis and Smith (1995), who also have investigated the links between 
ownership structure and R&D, but who have done so in a US context where Controlling Minority 
Structures are infrequent. By studying the Canadian context, we have shown that the relationship 
between ownership structures and R&D activity can be affected by the magnitude of the 
separation between voting rights and cashflow rights.   
Our research is, of course, not free from limitations. First, measuring R&D outcome by 
the number of granted patents could be challenged.  The fact that some firms may willingly 
decide not to patent their innovations affects the quality of our proxy. Another limitation lies in 
our research design, which measures the investments in innovative activities through R&D 
spending as reported by the firms in their annual report. This design does not recognize other 
forms of innovative activity. It is certainly possible that firms could find ways to innovate 
without reporting all of their innovating activities through their R&D accounts. In order to better 
understand the impact of corporate ownership on innovative activity, other forms of innovative 












































1. Francis and Smith (1995) also use this measure of R&D outcome while Czarnitzki and Kraft 
(2005) use the number of issued patents as their proxy of R&D outcome. Because we assume 
only the granted patents officialise the actual innovation ensuing from R&D activity, we chose 
Francis and Smith’s proxy.  
 
2. This proxy is also used in other studies analysing the effects of voting rights concentration on 
firm performance (Bozec and Laurin, 2004; Gompers et al., 2004; Cronqvist and Nilsson, 2003). 
In Canada, the presence of pyramid structures suggests that identifying the voting rights owned 
by the immediate controlling shareholder may not be sufficient to fully appreciate ownership 
concentration. Therefore, when the principal shareholder of a firm is another corporate entity, we 
find the principal shareholder of that entity, and so on, until we find the ultimate controlling 
shareholder. 
 
3. We also have performed test using 1) the ratio of cash flow rights on voting rights, and 2) a 
dummy variable which takes the value of one when there is separation between voting rights and 
cash flow rights, zero otherwise. See the sensitivity analysis section. 
 
4. The results are not reported. 
 
5. Greene, W.C, “Econometric analysis, fifth edition” 2003, p.740, note 66. 
 
6. Although the full sample size consists on 1192 observations, the sample size drops to 873 firm-
year observations when control variables such as firms’ age and founders are included.   
Furthermore, because patent information is not available for every observation, the full sample 
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R&D intensity by industry 
  R&D 
INDUSTRY Average  Minimum  Maximum  Std  deviation 
Metals & Mining                           0.027 0.000 0.244  0.060
Gold & Precious Metals                    0.000 0.000 0.000  0.000
Chemicals & Fertilizers                   0.010 0.000 0.082  0.018
Containers                                0.011 0.000 0.037  0.013
Oil & Gas - Integrated                    0.008 0.000 0.025  0.007
Oil & Gas - Exploration & Production      0.012 0.000 0.049  0.018
Energy: Drilling                          0.000 0.000 0.000  0.000
Energy: Equipment & Services              0.010 0.000 0.035  0.012
Aerospace & Defense                       0.002 0.000 0.011  0.003
Building Products                         0.001 0.000 0.010  0.003
Commercial Printing                       0.002 0.000 0.012  0.004
Commercial Services                       0.155 0.071 0.295  0.075
Construction, Engineering, Fabricating    0.006 0.000 0.054  0.015
Electrical Equipment                      0.064 0.004 0.715  0.119
Environment                               0.016 0.000 0.047  0.021
Industrial Conglomerates                  0.053 0.000 0.177  0.061
Industrial Machinery                      0.019 0.000 0.099  0.025
Office Equipment & Services               0.000 0.000 0.000  0.000
Specialty Industries                      0.000 0.000 0.000  0.000
Auto Parts                                0.047 0.000 0.722  0.134
Household Durables                        0.003 0.000 0.025  0.006
Movies & Entertainment                    0.004 0.000 0.015  0.005
Food  - Processing                        0.000 0.000 0.000  0.000
Tobacco & Agriculture                     0.005 0.000 0.015  0.006
Telecom Services - Wireless               0.122 0.000 0.569  0.193
Telecom Services - Alternative            0.000 0.000 0.000  0.000
Computers & Peripherals                   0.241 0.000 1.719  0.403
Electronic Equipment                      0.050 0.000 0.189  0.063
Internet                                  0.000 0.000 0.000  0.000
IT Consulting                             0.036 0.000 0.077  0.029
Networking                                0.139 0.023 0.392  0.107
Semiconductors                            0.162 0.000 0.380  0.099
Software                                  0.154 0.045 0.503  0.108
Telecom Equipment & Systems               0.074 0.004 0.408  0.065
Other Technologies                        0.085 0.015 0.278  0.060
Financial & Investment Services           0.009 0.000 0.025  0.012
Biotechnology                             0.288 0.000 1.838  0.298
Pharmaceuticals                           0.122 0.000 0.685  0.158











































Patents Granted per year by industry 
  PGY 
INDUSTRY Average  Minimum  Maximum  Std  deviation 
Metals & Mining                           11.600 0 266.000  42.938
Gold & Precious Metals                    0.000 0 0.000  0.000
Chemicals & Fertilizers                   0.264 0 10.000  1.430
Containers                                0.889 0 6.000  1.605
Oil & Gas - Integrated                    5.778 0 35.000  10.229
Oil & Gas - Exploration & Production      0.056 0 1.000  0.236
Energy: Drilling                          0.000 0 0.000  0.000
Energy: Equipment & Services              0.300 0 3.000  0.758
Aerospace & Defense                       0.259 0 3.000  0.764
Building Products                         0.514 0 5.000  1.422
Commercial Printing                       0.167 0 1.000  0.408
Commercial Services                       0.167 0 1.000  0.408
Construction, Engineering, Fabricating    0.067 0 2.000  0.365
Electrical Equipment                      1.000 0 7.000  2.112
Environment                               0.875 0 4.000  1.458
Industrial Conglomerates                  1.000 0 6.000  1.859
Industrial Machinery                      1.025 0 6.000  1.819
Office Equipment & Services               0.059 0 1.000  0.243
Specialty Industries                      0.000 0 0.000  0.000
Auto Parts                                0.714 0 12.000  2.127
Household Durables                        0.326 0 5.000  0.889
Movies & Entertainment                    0.000 0 0.000  0.000
Food  - Processing                        0.900 0 9.000  2.846
Tobacco & Agriculture                     0.750 0 4.000  1.357
Telecom Services - Wireless               0.000 0 0.000  0.000
Telecom Services - Alternative            0.000 0 0.000  0.000
Computers & Peripherals                   0.000 0 0.000  0.000
Electronic Equipment                      0.143 0 1.000  0.356
Internet                                  0.000 0 0.000  0.000
IT Consulting                             0.000 0 0.000  0.000
Networking                                1.200 0 5.000  2.168
Semiconductors                            0.697 0 6.000  1.591
Software                                  0.059 0 1.000  0.243
Telecom Equipment & Systems               0.024 0 1.000  0.156
Other Technologies                        0.944 0 10.000  2.190
Financial & Investment Services           0.000 0 0.000  0.000
Biotechnology                             0.333 0 5.000  0.783
Pharmaceuticals                           0.611 0 15.000  2.201











































List of Research Variables  
 
Dependant Variables  Description 
R&D  R&D expense/Total assets 
PGY  Number of granted patents in a given year 
Independant Variables  Description 
CONT  % of voting rights of the main controlling shareholder 
CONT50+  = % of voting rights of the main controlling shareholder when equal or 
over 50%. 
= 0, otherwise 
CMS  = 1, if % of voting rights of controlling shareholders is higher than their 
% of cash flow rights. 
= 0, otherwise 
SEPDIFF  = the difference between voting and cash flow rights of controlling 
shareholders (excess voting rights)  
CFR10SEPDIFF 
 
= the difference between voting and cash flow rights of controlling 
shareholders (excess voting rights) when cash flow rights are under 10% 
PYRSEPDIFF  = the difference between voting and cash flow rights of controlling 
shareholders (excess voting rights) for pyramidal structures. 
Control Variables  Description 
SIZE LN  (SALES) 
AGE  Number of years in operation 
IND  Industry’s average R&D/Asset ratio 
FONDATEUR  = 1, if the founder is present in top management or board. 
= 0, otherwise 
% II  % of voting rights held by institutional investors 
















































R&D 1192  0.000  1.838  0.069  0.151 
PGY 1013  0.000  266.000  0.962  9.034 
Ownership variables 
CONT 1192  0.000  1.000  0.283  0.251 
CMS 1192  0.000  1.000  0.176  0.381 
SEPDIFF 1192  0.000  0.660 0.059  0.149 
Control variables 
% II  1192  0.000  0.800  0.056  0.110 
FOUNDER 949  0.000  1.000  0.658  0.475 
AGE 1085  1.000  170.000  29.328  26.888 
SIZE 1192  3.664  16.912  11.387  2.422 
DEBT 1192  0.000  24.493  0.158  0.737 
IND 1192  0.000  0.555  0.071  0.099 
  
Table 1 provides descriptive statistics of all the variables in this study. See Appendix 3 for the detailed 











































Univariate comparisons between R&D activity variables across ownership levels and ownership 
structures  
Closely held firms 
(20% level)  Widely held firms  Section 1 









R&D  0,024 0,117  -10,954  0,000 
PGY
  0,885 1,050  -0,292  0,771 
CMS firms  Conventional firms   Section 2 
N= 210  N=965 
t-test
 a   Sig 
(two tailed) 
PGY
 b   1,964 0,728  2,011  0,045 
 
In table 2, R&D is a proxy for R&D intensity, estimated by the R&D/Assets ratio. PGY is a proxy 
for a R&D outcome, estimated by the number of yearly granted patents.  See Appendix 3 for the 
detailed description of R&D variables.  The first section of table 2, compares R&D activity across 
different ownership levels.  In this analysis, Closely held firms are defined as firms for which the 
controlling shareholder holds 20% and more voting rights. All other firms are considered Widely held 
firms. Section 2 of table 2 compares R&D outcome across different ownership structure types. In this 
analysis, we compare CMS to Conventional non-CMS firms.  CMS firms are defined as firms for which 
the voting rights of the controlling shareholders exceed their cash flow rights.  All other firms are 
considered, Conventional non-CMS firms 
 
 











































Univariate analysis of corporate ownership structures and R&D activity 
 
   CONT  SEPDIFF  CMS  R&D  PGY 
Pearson Correlation  1.000  
CONT  Sig. (2-tailed)  .   
Pearson Correlation  0.566*** 1.000  
SEPDIFF  Sig. (2-tailed)  0.000.  
Pearson Correlation  0.565*** 0.863*** 1.000  
CMS  Sig. (2-tailed)  0.000 0.000.  
Pearson Correlation  -0.296*** -0.164*** -0.192*** 1.000 
R&D  Sig. (2-tailed)  0.000 0.000 0.000. 
Pearson Correlation  -0.018 0.020 0.054* -0.029 1.000
PGY  Sig. (2-tailed)  0.569 0.517 0.088 0.362 . 
Table 3 presents Pearson’s correlation matrix between ownership structure variables and R&D 
activity variables of this study. See Appendix 3 for the detailed description of these variables.  
















































































In table 4, R&D is a proxy for R&D intensity, estimated by the R&D/Assets ratio. PGY is a proxy for a 
R&D outcome, estimated by the number of yearly granted patents.  See Appendix 3 for the detailed lists 
of independent and control variables.  The symbols *, **, *** indicate statistical significance levels at 10 
%, 5 % and 1 % respectively. 
 
Dependent variable    R&D  PGY 




   H1a  H1b  H2 
Coeff.  -0.067
** 0.898  2.509
***
CONT 
t-value  -2.58  1.23  2.67 
Coeff.     -4.419
***
SEPDIFF 
t-value     -2.72 
Coeff.  -0.020
*** -0.02 0.09  SIZE 
t-value  -7.77  -0.20  0.95 
Coeff.  0.42
*** 2.23  3.51
*
IND 
t-value  6.54  1.16  1.74 




t-value 1.16  2.99  2.26 
Coeff. -0.00  0.12  0.08  FOUNDER 
t-value -0.08  0.27  0.18 
Coeff. -0.07  -0.52  -1.80  %II 






t-value  3.59  5.77  5.78 
Coeff.  0.316
*** -1.443  -2.523
**
CONST. 
t-value  8.45  -1.55  -2.46 
N  879   742 




















































  R&D                  PGY R&D PGY R&D PGY R&D PGY R&D PGY
Regression                         Tobit Poisson Tobit Poisson Tobit Poisson Tobit Poisson Tobit Poisson





** 0.004  -2.215* -0.031
*** -0,476  -0.018
*** -0.943  CONT 
t-value  -3.08  2.78  -2.84        2.62 1.01  -1.88 -7,42 -0,32  -3.95  -0.63 
Coeff.  0.712
* -3.325
**              CONT50+ 
t-value  1.89           -2.49      
Coeff.           0,050
*** -4,811
* 0.038
*** -2.881  SEPDIFF 
t-value                  8,26 -1,80 6.67 -1.22 
Coeff.           -0,029
*** 2,210      CFR10 
SEPDIFF  t-value           6,94  1,34     
Coeff.               0.011
** 1.058  PYRSEPDIFF 
t-value               2.50  0.60 
Coeff.  -0.024
*** 0.002  -0.03
*** 0.26
* -0.00
*** -0.05  -0.005
*** 0,139  -0.005
*** 0.083  SIZE 
t-value  -7.93  0.03  -7.45      1.89 -16.86 -0.29  -9.77  0,66  8.90  0.36 
Coeff.  0.410
*** 2.893  0.46 4.19
* 0.11
*** -6.34  0.079
*** -1,710  0.072
*** -3.301  IND 
t-value  6.60  1.51  6.33      1.82 9.90 -1.33  5,41  -0,35  5.49  -0.65 
Coeff.            0.000 0.034






t-value                  1.22 3.21  1.49 0.89 -1.30 2.78 2.49 2,30  6.00 2.16





t-value                    0.02 0.30 -0.20 0.26 -0.08 2.02  4,83 1,93 4.80 1.84
Coeff.                      -0.038 -1.694 -0.06 -2.28 -0.01 4.31 0.008 2,57 -0.005 2.875 %II 
















** 0.056  -0.696  0.066
*** -2,863 0.056
*** -2.223  CONST. 
t-value  8.73                -2.07 8.25  -2.98 . -0.27  10,04 -1,04 6.81 -0.76
N  879               742 713  596   166 146 166 146 166 146









In table 5, R&D is a proxy for R&D intensity, estimated by the ratio R&D/Assets. PGY is a proxy for a R&D outcome, estimated by the number of yearly granted patents.  Regressions 1 
and 2 are performed on all firms in our sample. See Appendix 3 for the detailed lists of independent and control variables. Regressions 3 and 4 are performed on a subsample of conventional 
non CMS firms and regressions 4 to 10 are performed on a subsample of CMS firms. The symbols *, **, *** indicate statistical significance levels  at 10 %, 5 % and 1 % respectively. 
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